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THE STEEL SEIZURE CASE:
ONE OF A KIND?
Neal Devins*
Louis Fisher**
By confronting President Harry Truman and striking down
his effort to seize the steel mills needed to prosecute the Korean
War,' the Supreme Court adhered to its longstanding practice of
accepting and deciding cases dealing with the war power. Yet
over the next half century the courts systematically sidestepped
this type of case. In this essay, we will explain why the Court asserted itself in 1952 and why the modern Court seems incapable,
or unwilling, to decide fundamental constitutional issues regarding the allocation of the war power between Congress and the
President.
Before turning to the 1952 steel seizure, we need to flag a
dispute. Some defenders of presidential war power do not regard Youngstown as a foreign affairs case. Instead, they view it
as a case about the "taking of private property without due
process of law." 2 Others, who think that Congress and the
courts should check presidential war-making, call Youngstown
"the Brown v. Board of Education of foreign affairs litigation. " 3
But no matter how one characterizes Youngstown's precedential
significance, the Court's willingness to assert itself can be traced,
in part, to the Justices' then-customary practice of adjudicating

* Goodrich Professor of Law and Professor of Government, College of William
and Mary.
** Senior Specialist in Separation of Powers, Congressional Research Service, The
Library of Congress. Thanks to Mike Paulsen for asking us to participate in this symposium. Thanks also to John Gilmore and Mike Glennon for helpful comments on an earlier draft.
I. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
2. John Norton Moore, Frederick S. Tipson, Robert F. Turner, National Security
Law 773 (Carolina Academic Press, 1990).
3. David Cole, Youngstown v. Curtiss-Wright, 99 Yale L.J. 2063, 2081 (1990). See
also Harold Hongju Koh, The National Security Constitution: Sharing Power After the
Iran-Contra Affair 105-13 (1990).
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war-making disputes, disposing of them as they would any other
legal or constitutional dispute.
Section I of this essay explains why we think this is so, calling attention to a host of factors contributing to the Court's repudiation of the seizure. Section II builds upon this analysis.
Following a brief discussion of how Supreme Court decisionmaking is tied to social and political forces, we explore why today's Court is loath to assume its traditional role in our system of
checks and balances. In particular, pointing to fundamental
changes in executive-legislative relations over the past fifty
years, we explain how the modern Court has altered its decisionmaking. In Section III, we suggest that this reversal, while
understandable, is undermining our system of constitutional
governance. In our view, no branch should hold a monopoly
over the initiation of war.
I. JUDGES CONFRONT TRUMAN

President Harry Truman took the initiative in June 1950 to
order U.S. forces to Korea. By acting solely on his interpretation of presidential power, Truman became the first president to
involve the Nation in a major war without receiving specific authorization from Congress. Nevertheless, had the Steel Seizure
Case reached the courts in late 1950 or early 1951, judges-leery
to hinder prosecution of the war-might have sidestepped a judicial resolution of the issue. 5 At that time, Congress and the nation backed the president's initiative. 6 However, by the time
Truman issued his 1952 executive order taking control of certain
steel companies, a cluster of military, legal, and political factors
conspired to markedly erode presidential power and embolden
the judiciary.

4. See Louis Fisher, The Korean War: On What Legal Basis Did Truman Act?, 89
Am. J. Inti. Law 21 (1995); David Gray Adler, Foreign Policy and the Separation of Powers: The Influence of the Judiciary, in Michael W. McCann and Gerald L. Houseman,
eds., Judging the Constitution: Critical Essays on Judicial Lawmaking 172 (Scott, Foresman and Co., 1989); Louis Fisher, Congressional Abdication on War and Spending 20-21,
50 (Texas A & M U. Press, 2000) ("Abdication") (distinguishing Korea from instances
where presidents had acted without Congress's approval); EdwardS. Corwin, The President's Power, New Republic 16 (Jan. 29, 1951).
5. See Paul A. Freund, The Supreme Court 1951 Term-Foreword: The Year of the
Steel Case, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 89, 90 (1952) (discussing how the Supreme Court could have
slowed down the Steel Seizure litigation). For additional discussion, see notes 76-77.
6. See Fisher, Abdication at 42-44 (cited in note 4); James L. Sundquist, The Decline and Resurgence of Congress 107-10 (Brookings Institution, 1981).
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The context of the case put the President's power as Commander in Chief front and center. Truman's executive order was
drafted almost entirely as a military imperative. The second
paragraph pointed out that "American fighting men and fighting
men of the United Nations are now engaged in deadly combat
with the forces of aggression in Korea." 7 The weapons and materials needed for that effort "are produced to a great extent in this
country, and steel is an indispensable component of substantially
all of such weapons and materials." 8 A work stoppage, he
warned, "would immediately jeopardize and imperil our national
defense and the defense of those joined with us in resisting aggression, and would add to the continuing danger of our soldiers,
sailors, and airmen engaged in combat in the field." 9 The first of
seven paragraphs ordering the Secretary of Commerce to seize
the steel mills directed him to take possession of all such plants
"as he may deem necessary in the interests of national defense."10
For proponents of unilateral presidential war-making, Truman's seizing of the steel mills could not have come at a worse
time. By 1952, the United States had reached a stalemate in Korea, resulting in heavy American casualties and providing little
hope for success. 11 With public opposition to his war swelling,
Truman's standing in public opinion reached its nadir. 12 The Korean issue, "not crooks or Communists," "cut deepest" with the
voters. 13 For example, the high point of the 1952 presidential
campaign came on October 24 when Dwight D. Eisenhower denounced Truman's war, promising to end it by "go[ing] to Korea."14
Dissatisfaction with the war destroyed Truman's popularity
and had much to do with Eisenhower's landslide victory. It also
called attention to the fact that, legally, Truman had been skating on thin ice throughout the Korean conflict. 15 He claimed to
7. Exec. Order No. 10,340,17 Fed. Reg. 3139 (Apr. 8, 1952).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 3141.
10. Id.
II. T.R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War: A Study in Unpreparedness (Macmillan
Co., 1963); RichardS. Kirkendall, Harry S. Truman, Korea and the Imperial Presidency
(Forum Press, 1975).
12. William H. Rehnquist, The Supreme Court 191 (2001 ed.).
13. Stephen E. Ambrose, 1 Eisenhower: Soldier, General of the Army, PresidentElect 1890-1952 at 569 (Simon & Schuster, 1983). See also David McCullough, Truman
913 (Simon & Schuster, 1992).
14. Quoted in McCullough, Truman at 912 (cited in note 13).
15. For a detailed analysis, sec Fisher, 89 Am. J. Inti. Law (cited in note 4); Louis
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be acting in response to a resolution adopted by the United Nations Security Council. 16 But that claim was false. Truman had
committed U.S. forces before the Council called for military action. As his Secretary of State Dean Acheson later admitted,
"some American action, said to be in support of the resolution of
June 27, was in fact ordered, and possibly taken, prior to the
resolution.'' 17 More significant, Truman ignored Congress's
statutory command in the U.N. Participation Act of 1945, that
Congress (through legislation or a joint resolution) first approve
the deployment of forces in a U.N. initiated action. 18 For this
reason, Truman pointed to his December 1950 proclamation of a
national emergency as legal authority for seizing the steel mills,
not the U.N. authorization of military action. 19
Truman was on shaky legal footing for another reason. In
large measure, his decision to seize the steel mills was tied to his
refusal to make use of two statutory remedies prescribed by
Congress. 20 By invoking the Taft-Hartley Act, for example,
Truman could have temporarily enjoined steel workers from
striking and, in this way, could have averted a work stoppage
without seizing control of the steel mills. But Truman, a friend
of labor, had earlier vetoed Taft-Hartley. 21 Indeed, instead of
following Taft-Hartley procedures, Truman referred the steel
dispute to the Wage Stabilization Board. And when that effort
failed, Truman again refused to invoke Taft-Hartley-claiming
both that it was unfair to labor (who had already postponed
striking) and that the "greed[ ]" of steel companies threatened
"our whole price control program. " 22
Fisher, Presidential War Power 70-91 (U. Press of Kansas, 1995).
16. 1950 Pub. Papers 492.
17. Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department 408
(W.W. Norton & Co., 1969).
18. U.N. Participation Act of 1945, 59 Stat. 621, sec. 6. After ordering U.S. troops
to Korea, Truman considered presenting a joint resolution to Congress to permit lawmakers to voice their approval, but decided against it. 7 Foreign Relations of the United
States 282-83 nn. 1 & 2, 287-91 (1976). It should be noted that some members of Congress, including Senate majority leader Scott Lucas, told Truman _that he could act without legislative authorization. See Fisher, Abdication at 44 (c1ted m note 4). But even 1f
Truman felt that the exigencies surrounding his June 1950 decision required immediate
action, there was nothing that prevented him from returning to Congress at a later date.
That way he would not violate a clear legislative command.
19. Exec. Order No. 10,340, 17 Fed. Reg. 3139 (Apr. 8, 1952).
20. See Maeva Marcus, Truman and the Steel Seizure Case: The Limits of Presidential Power 77-78 (Duke U. Press, 1994) (discussing the national emergency dispute provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act and the Selective Service Act).
21. See McCullough, Truman at 565-66 (cited in note 13).
22. 1952-53 Pub. Papers 249. The Wage Stabilization Board had recommended an
hourly increase of 26 cents. McCullough, Truman at 897-98 (cited in note 13). In re-
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Against this backdrop, Truman had a hard time convincing
the nation that the steel seizure represented a national emergency instead of a labor dispute. Newspapers repeatedly declared that the "United States government was no longer a 'neutral referee' in labor-management dispute[s)." 23 Time magazine
accused Truman of acting "primarily as a politician, not as a
President ... Politician Harry Truman was obviously operating
on the axiom of political arithmetic that there are more votes in
Big Labor than in Big Steel." 24 And the Nation argued that "a
just settlement of a labor dispute" is not enough to excuse the
president's "arbitrary exercise of executive power." 25
Making matters worse, Truman's initial defense of the steel
seizure was grounded in an ambitious theory of unlimited presidential power, namely, "that the president's power was absolute
unless some provision of the Constitution expressly denied authority to him. "26 One week after the seizure, at a news conference on April 17, a reporter asked: "Mr. President, if you can
seize the steel mills under your inherent powers, can you, in your
opinion, also seize the newspapers and/or the radio stations?"
Truman never flinched: "Under similar circumstances the President has to act for whatever is for the best of the country. That's
the answer to your question." 27 Three days later, at another
news conference, Truman claimed that the president "has verts
great inherent powers to meet great national emergencies." 8
More telling, when asked if he recognized the "danger" to our
liberties by substituting inherent presidential power for the written law, Truman responded: "Well, of course I do ... But when
you meet an emergency in an emergency, you have to meet it. "29
In other words, Truman was not merely asserting authority over
certain domestic activities, but was announcing an overarching
theory of presidential emergency authority that cut across every
area, domestic and foreign.

sponse, the steel companies demanded a $12 a ton increase to the price of steel (as a con·
dition to their agreeing to the Board's recommendation on wages). Id. at 898. Accusing
the companies of being "profiteer[s)," Truman thought the price of settling this labor
dispute was simply too high. ld.
23. Marcus, Truman and the Steel Seizure Case at 90 (cited in note 20).
24. ld. (quoting Time 23 (Apr. 21, 1952)).
25. Id at 89 (quoting the Nation 393 (Apr. 26, 19520)).
26. Rehnquist, The Supreme Court at 190 (cited in note 12).
27. Pub. Papers (1952-1953) at 272-73 (Truman).
28. ld. at 290.
29. ld at 294.
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The public reaction was swift and savage. The great majority of newspapers rejected this sweeping doctrine of executive
power. An editorial in the New York Times rebuked Truman for
creating "a new regime of government by executive decree," a
system of government that was inconsistent "with our own democratic principle of government by laws and not by men. " 30
The Washington Post predicted that Truman's action "will
probably go down in history as one of the most high-handed acts
committed by an American President." 31 Other newspapers
weighed in with various forms of denunciation, excoriating Truman for trying to exercise "dictatorial powers." 32 The Atlanta
Constitution called Truman's order "dangerous"; the Boston
Herald objected to Truman's effort to "dictatorially" bypass
Congress by making his own law; the Christian Science Monitor
accused him of precipitating "a constitutional and political crisis"; and the Detroit Free Press warned that unless someone
stopped Truman's exertion of power "our whole constitutional
system is doomed to destruction. " 33
Truman soon recognized that his definition of emergency
power was too high-flying and ill-defined to sit well with the
public. He pointed out, for example, that Congress could pass
legislation "reject[ing] the course of action I have followed in
this matter. " 34 These efforts to define executive power in a less
ominous light, however, were quickly dispelled by Justice Department attorneys. In district court, Assistant Attorney General Homer Baldridge told Judge David A. Pine that President
Truman had sufficient power under the Constitution to seize the
steel mills. It seemed to Baldridge that "there is enough residual
power in the executive to meet an emergency situation of this
type when it comes up." Pine's reaction was chilling: "I think
that whatever decision I reach, Mr. Baldridge, I shall not adopt
the view that there is anyone in this Government whose power is
unlimited, as you seem to indicate." 35
Baldridge refused to back off, as prudence or political
judgment might have dictated. He advised Pine that there were
30. Editorial, The Seizure Order, N.Y. Times 28 (Apr. 10, 1952).
31. 98 Cong. Rec. 4034 (1952).
32. Id. at 4033 (New York Daily Compass).
33. Id
34. 1952-53 Pub. Papers 284. Truman also acknowledged that he was bound by the
rule of law. Instead of bold and blustery statements about inherent power, Truman spoke
of presidential powers as "limited, of course, by the provisions of the Constitution, particularly those that protect the rights of individuals." Id. at 301.
35. H.R. Doc. No. 534 (Part I), 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 258 (1952).
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only two limitations on executive power: "One is the ballot box
and the other is impeachment." When Judge Pine asked
whether he was arguing that when a "sovereign people" granted
powers to the federal government, "it limited Congress, it limited the judiciary, but did not limit the executive," Baldridge
cheerfully replied: "That's our conception, Your Honor." 36 Judicial review was not a limitation? Pine pursued the point, asking
whether if the President determines that an emergency exists,
"the Courts cannot even review whether it is an emergency."
Baldridge's response: "That is correct." 37
Judge Pine lost little time in jettisoning this theory of
"unlimited and unrestrained Executive power." 38 In striking
down the executive order on April 29, Pine set about demolishing the theory of an emergency power that is not subject to judicial review: "To my mind this [theory) spells a form of government alien to our Constitutional government of limited powers"
and, consequently, to recognize it "would undermine public confidence in the verx edifice of government as it is known under
the Constitution." 9
Pine's blistering opinion was embraced by the press and, ultimately, the public. A Washington Post editorial spoke of the
opinion as one "that will long be remembered in the annals of
free government." 40 Perhaps more significant, as The New York
Times contended, Pine's opinion shifted attention away from the
labor dispute in the steel industry and to "the question of constitutional powers and relationships." 41 Indeed, by suggesting that
the "awful results" of a strike "would be less injurious to the
public" than recognition of the president's claim of unbounded
power,42 Pine's opinion prompted the "first serious questioning
in the press of the extent of the emergency. " 43 An editorial in
The Wall Street I ournal, for example, suggested that the only
proof offered by Truman was his pronouncement that an emergency existed. 44

36. Joseph A. Loftus, President's Power Is Not Restricted, Says U.S. Lawyer, N.Y.
Times, 1 (Apr. 26, 1952). See also Joseph Paull, U.S. Argues President Is Above Courts,
Wash. Post 1 (Apr. 25, 1952).
37. H.R. Doc. No. 534 (Part I) at 371-72.
38. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 103 F. Supp. 569,577 (D.D.C. 1952).
39. Id. at 576-77.
40. Editorial, Steel Injunction, Wash. Post 16 (Apr. 30 1952).
41. Editorial, Government Under Law, N.Y. Times 26 (Apr. 30, 1952).
42. 103 F. Supp. at 577.
43. Marcus, Truman and the Steel Seizure Case at 131 (cited in note 20).
44. Id. at 131 (discussing Wall St. J. at 8 (Apr. 30, 1952)).
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The consequence of all this was quite devastating to the
president. Gallup Polls showed that growing public disapproval
of the seizure was tied to the Pine decision. And this popular reaction "traveled through the higher courts ... [becomingl an important element in the legal decision-making process." 5 The
administration tried to turn the tide of public opinion but could
not. Scrambling for a more publicly (and judicially) acceptable
definition of presidential authority, executive officials now entirely jettisoned the sweeping arguments made before the district
court. In particular, rather than rely on the president's inherent
powers, the government also argued that the president was simply putting into effect the defense programs authorized by Congress.46
Administration efforts to recalibrate their position proved
futile. With neither a formal declaration of war nor explicit
statutory authorization to seize the steel mills, Solicitor General
Philip Perlman was unable to erase the lasting impression left by
the government's highly publicized district court argument.
When Perlman sought to close his argument with rhetorical
flourish, insisting that "we are under war conditions," Justices
Jackson and Frankfurter pointed out that Congress did not view
Korea as a war. 47 Perlman's claim that Truman was quite willing
to follow congressional directions likewise met resistance. Questioning by Justice Frankfurter disclosed that the administration
treated Congress's failure to outlaw the seizure as de facto legislative approval of it;48 questioning by Justice Jackson and Chief
Justice Vinson underscored the administration's belief that it
had independent authority to seize the mills. 49
On June 2, 1952, the Court issued its decision invalidating
the seizure. "Few decisions," according to reactions reported in
The New York Times and Harvard Law Review, "have been so
popularly received." 50 Earl Warren, then governor of California,
hailed the decision for "remov[ing] the challenge to the basic
American principle that we have three equal and coordinate
45. Id. at 130. Accord Rehnquist, The Supreme Coun at 191-92 (cited in note 12).
46. Brief for Petitioner Charles Sawyer, 144-172, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
47. Philip B. Kurland and Gerhard Casper eds., 48 Landmark Briefs and Arguments
of the Supreme Coun of the United States: Constitutional Law 959 (U. Publications of
America, 1975).
48. Id. at 908.
49. Id. at 906-07.
50. The Supreme Court, 1951 Term, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 98, 99 (1952) (citing N.Y.
Times news stories).
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branches of governrnent." 51 Most in Congress likewise praised
the Court for "declar[ing] that our Constitution is not to be em52
ployed to serve the purposes and whims of individual men."
For their part, newspapers praised the Court for "fulfill[ing] its
53
constitutional duty to check a headstrong president. "
One of the law clerks on the Supreme Court in 1952 was
William Rehnquist. At the time of the decision, he thought that
Truman would win. After all, the Court was comprised of Roosevelt and Truman appointees and "the entire decisional trend
for fifteen years [1937-52] had been in the direction of the a§grandizement of the powers of the president and Congress." 4
That the Justices went so decisively against presidential power,
in the middle of a war, came as a surprise to many. Years later,
reflecting on what happened in district court and the Supreme
Court, Rehnquist developed a keener appreciation of the impact
of public opinion on the judiciary. He now concluded: "I think
that this is one of those celebrated constitutional cases where
what might be called the tide of public opinion suddenly began
to run against the government, for a number of reasons, and that
this tide of public opinion had a considerable influence on the
Court." 55

*****
Many factors made the Steel Seizure case "one of a kind":
Truman was an unpopular, pro-labor president; he seized private
property in an effort to sidestep the dictates of Taft-Hartley; and
he justified the seizure by pointing to a war that increasingly
seemed unwinable. In 1952, moreover, the culture of expectations governing presidential war-making made the steel seizure
case unique. At that time, presidents did not send troops into a
major war without congressional approval. Likewise, the Senate
did not approve the U.N. or NATO as a way of end-running
Congress. And finally, presidents did not point to their inherent
powers as "commander in chief" as a warrant for unilateral ex-

51.

Marcus, Truman and the Steel Seizure Case at 213 (cited in note 20) (quoting

L.A. Times 1 (June 3, 1952)).

52. 98 Cong. Rec. 6289 (1952) (remarks of Senator Harry Cain). For additional
quotes, see Marcus, Truman and the Steel Seizure Case at 213 (cited in note 20).
53. Id. at 213 (quoting The Pittsburgh Press 22 (June 3, 1952)).
54. Rehnquist, The Supreme Court at 171 (cited in note 12).
55. William H. Rehnquist, The Supreme Court: How It Was, How it Is 95 (William
Morrow and Co., 1987). See also Rehnquist, The Supreme Court at 192 (cited in note 12)
(same).
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ecutive war-making. 56 Instead, at the time of Youngstown,
courts saw war-making as part and parcel of our system of
checks and balances-something that Congress and the courts
had a say in.
More than anything else, it was this culture of expectations
that explains the judiciary's repudiation of Truman's steel seizure. Consider, for example, then-existing norms governing judicial involvement in the war power. From 1789 to 1952, federal
courts accepted and adjudicated disputes over war. Could Congress either declare or authorize war? Yes, it could do either
one, said the Supreme Court in 1800 and 1801.57 What happened
when a presidential proclamation conflicted with statutory policy? Which one prevailed? An 1804 decision sided with Congress. 58 Could the administration seize, as enemy property, material found on U.S. land at the commencement of hostilities in
1812? Not without congressional authority, said the Court. 59
Could the President, as Commander in Chief, annex territory to
the United States by virtue of a military conquest? No, said the
Court in 1850, unless the President received authority from Congress.60
Many other war power cases came to the Court and were
decided there. Federal courts have had to decide when wars begin and when they end. What power does a President have in
imposing duties on goods coming from the United States to a
conquered country? He has that power, but not after ratification
of the treaty of peace, when the power to impose duties returns
to Congress. 61 Federal courts have placed limits on military authorities who made arrests without a warrant. 62 Courts reviewed
the constitutionality of war-efficiency statutes that continued in
operation after the signing of an armistice. 63 A number of World

56. Even during World War II, when there was little collaboration between Congress and the president, "Presidents (whenever acting unilaterally) always offered an excuse or rationale; never did they assert that they had inherent war power." Michael Ratner and David Cole, The Force of Law: Judicial Enforcement of the War Powers
Resolution, 17 Loyola L.A. L. Rev. 715, 723 (1984) (discussing W. Taylor Reveley, Presidential War-Making: Constitutional Prerogative or Usurpation?, 55 Va. L. Rev. 1243
(1969)).
57. Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (Dall.) 37 (1800); Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1
(1801 ).
58. Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).
59. Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814).
60. Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 603 (1850).
61. Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222 (1901).
62. Ex parte Orozco, 201 F. 106 (W.D. Tex. 1912), dismissed, 229 U.S. 633 (1913).
63. Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 251 U.S. 146 (1919).

2002]

STEEL SEIZURE CASE: ONE OFA KIND?

73

War II cases required judges to determine the extent to which
Congress could delegate its powers to administrative officials. 64
Could Congress and the President place curfews on JapaneseAmericans and later place them in detention camps? The Court
decided both issues. 6 In a number of cases, the Court tackled
the legitimacy of military trials and military tribunals. 66
These rulings sided at times with the president and sometimes against him. Many of the decisions approved governmental claims of military necessity and/or upheld broad delegations
of power to the president. 67 By 1952, moreover, the balance of
power between Congress and the president had begun to shift.
When Truman sent troops to Korea, Congress did not defend its
prerogatives; instead, it stood by on the sidelines and cheered on
the president. 68 At the same time, social and political norms did
not see the president as the "sole organ" of the United States in
international affairs. 69 Not only did courts resolve these disputes/0 Korea stood as the sole exception to the general consti64. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 424 (1944); Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503
(1944).
65. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214 (1944).
66. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942); Application of Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946);
Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946).
67. Consider, for example, Korematsu's approval of the internment of Japanese
Americans during World War II. Here, the Court accepted at face value government
claims of military necessity. See Earl Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 181 (1962) (explaining judicial reluctance to second-guess military judgments).
68. See note 6 and accompanying text.
69. We refer here, of course, to dicta in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exporr
Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936). In Youngstown, the Court (both in Justice Black's majority opinion and in Justice Jackson's concurring opinion) distanced itself from CurtissWright, concluding that Curtiss-Wrighr rested on whether or not Congress had delegated
power to the president (and not on the president's inherent power). See 343 U.S. at 585
(majority opinion); id. at 635-36 n.2 (Jackson, concurring). This view is consistent with
an early analysis of the case published in the Harvard Law Review. See Recent Cases, 50
Harv. L. Rev. 691, 692 (1937) (noting that "the theory of the decision" links Congress's
power over foreign commerce to the "President's control over foreign relations" and
concluding that "how far the delegation may go remains for future clarification."). See
also Michael J. Glennon, Constitutional Diplomacy 18 (Princeton U. Press, 1990) (suggesting that the Court saw Curtiss-Wright as a way to respond to fears that recent nondelegation decisions "might straitjacket the United States in dealing with the Nazi
threat").
70. For an overview, sec notes 57-66; Major Geoffrey S. Corn, Presidential War
Powers: Do the Courts Offer Any Answers?, 157 Mil. L. Rev. 180, 205-15 (1998). Consider, for example, Curtiss-Wright. Rather than suggest that courts should not review
executive actions in foreign affairs, the Court did review the President's actions (upholdmg It as bemg authonzed by Congress). See Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 Yale L.J.
1255, 1308 n.242. (1988).

74

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 19:63

tutional principle that the -Rower to initiate war against foreign
nations lay with Congress. Lawmaker acquiescence to Korea,
for example, did not stop Congress, in 1951, from resisting Truman's efforts to send ground troops into Europe. 72 Even more
telling, Dwight Eisenhower, unwilling to preside over a Korealike debacle in Indochina, made clear that it "would be completely unconstitutional & indefensible" to deploy troops in "the
absence of some kind of arrangement getting support of Congress. "73
The "struggle for the privilege of directin~ American foreign policy" was, in fact, a struggle in 1952.7 The norm of
checks and balances still fueled the courts and, as such, Truman's
unilateralism was seen as a real threat to our system of government. That is why Judge Pine's decision resonated with the nation. That too is why the Justices used the Steel Seizure case as a
vehicle to speak broadly about the scope of executive power.
We do not mean to suggest here that expectations regarding
our system of checks and balances, in and of themselves, explain
the courts' decisions in Youngstown. The unpopularity of Korea
and, with it, Truman's plummeting support, also fueled the decision.75 Had the nation supported Truman and his war, there
would have been no public outcry following the seizure and,
consequently, the courts would not have been pressured to check
a runaway president. For example, had Truman seized the steel
mills in 1950 (when the public stood behind his Korean initiative), the Supreme Court might well have looked for a way to
avoid ruling against the president. 76 There was, for example, no
71. Fisher, Abdication at 15-33 (cited in note 4) (discussing 1789-1945 period); id. at
36-39 (discussing 1945 UN Participation Act and 1949 NATO Treaty).
72. Truman had claimed that he did not need congressional approval, prompting an
outcry in both the House and Senate. Hearings were held and Truman-notwithstanding
his claim that lawmaker approval was beside the point-waited to see what Congress
would do. But a majority in Congress agreed with the president and the issue fizzled
when the Senate passed a resolution approving of Truman's initiative (but contending
that congressional approval should be obtained before future deployments of troops).
See Sundquist, The Decline and Resurgence of Congress 110-13 (cited in note 6).
73. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, vol. XIII, part 1, at 1242.
See also Public Papers of the President, 1954, 306 (same).
74. Edward S. Corwin, The President: Office and Powers, 1787-1957 at 171 (New
York U. Press, 4th rev. ed.1957).
75. It is also worth remembering that fears of totalitarianism-so pronounced in
World War Il-remained salient in 1952. For this very reason, Truman's opponents
analogized his actions to those of the recently defeated European dictators. As Maeva
Marcus noted: "[t]he majority of unfavorable editorials characterized the President's action as dictatorial [with] the New York Daily News titl[ing] its editorial 'Truman Does a
Hitler'" Marcus, Truman and the Steel Seizure Case at 89 (cited in note 20).
76. See also Rehnquist, The Supreme Court at 191 (cited in note 12) (suggesting
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need for a judicial "rush to judgment" (bypassing the court of
appeals and issuing a sweeping decision against the administration two months after the seizure). Indeed, before the district
court, counsel for the steel industry did not seek to overturn the
seizure; instead, they only sought to enjoin the Truman administration from changing the terms of employment for steel work. . th eu
. wages. 77
ers, e.g., ratsmg
Ironically, the very forces that pushed the courts to check
the White House in Youngstown later pushed the courts in the
opposite direction. Over the past fifty years, the culture of expectations governing war powers has undergone a radical shift.
As we will soon detail, Congress no longer sees itself as a constitutional check on presidential war-making. Likewise, the public
and press increasingly see the president as the exclusive force in
foreign affairs. Responding to these changing norms, courts too
have limited their role in checking presidential initiatives. In the
next part of this essay, we will describe this phenomenon.
II. JUDGES STEP ASIDE

In the years since Youngstown, judicial pronouncements relating to the war powers have diminished to the point of being
virtually nonexistent. 78 By making aggressive use of ripeness
and standing limitations, for example, courts have refused to
hear lawmaker challenges to unilateral presidential war-making.
More generally, courts have concluded that numerous issues relating to war-making are political questions. And while the
courts have issued some decisions on national security issues,
these rulings seem quite far removed from Youngstown (where
the Court closely scrutinized presidential war-making).

that the government would have prevailed if the seizure had taken place during World
War II).
77. Freund, 66 Harv. L. Rev. at 90 (cited in note 5). That way the courts could have
heard evidence, rather than rely solely on affidavits. It should also be noted that the
courts could have sidestepped the question of inherent executive power by upholding the
president's action as consistent with existing federal law. See id at 91-94. See also note
46 and accompanying text (describing the government's Supreme Court brief).
78. For general treatments, see Adler, Foreign Policy and the Separation of Powers,
in McCann and Houseman, eds., Judging the Constitution (cited in note 4); Corn, 157 Mil.
L. Rev. (cited in note 70); Jonathan L. Entin, The Dog that Rarely Barks: Why the Courts
Won't Resolve the War Powers Debate, 47 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1305 (1997). See also
John 0. McGinnis, Constitutional Review by the Executive in Foreign Affairs and War
Powers: A Consequence of the Rational Choice in the Separation of Powers, 56 Law &
Contemp. Probs. 203, 306-08 (1993) (detailing reasons courts make use of justiciability
doctrines to steer clear of war making disputes).
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There is a relatively simple explanation for this phenomenon. If members of Congress fail to assert their prerogatives
over war and peace, federal judges are unwilling to fill the
breach left open by lawmakers. At the time of Youngstown,
Congress's failure to act was aberrational. Rather, as detailed
above, the culture of expectations was one in which Congress
was an active participant in war-making. Correspondingly,
judges assumed their traditional role in our system of checks and
balances-assessing the legality of governmental action. Today,
Congress's general practice is to acquiesce, not challenge, presidential war-making. With Congress retreating in war powers,
courts too have backed away. This section details how social and
political forces have pushed courts away from war powers issues.
Before doing so, we will briefll explain why those forces should
matter to the Supreme Court. 7
Just as the Supreme Court leaves its mark on American society, so are social forces part of the mix of constitutional law.
True, the Justices work in a somewhat insulated atmosphere.
But, as Chief Justice William Rehnquist reminded us, the "currents and tides of public opinion . . . lap at the courthouse
door," 80 for "judges go home at night and read the newspapers
or watch the evening news on television; they talk to their family
and friends about current events." 81 As such, "[j]udges, so long
as they are relatively normal human beings, can no more escape
being influenced by public opinion in the long run than can people working at other jobs." 82
Constitutional decisionmaking, moreover, is a dynamic
process that involves all parts of government and the people as
well. Lacking the power to appropriate funds or command the
military, the Court understands that it must act in a way that
garners public acceptance. Its power, as the Justices themselves
admit, lies in its legitimacy. 83 An especially telling manifestation
79. For a more detailed explanation (from which portions of the next three paragraphs are drawn), see Neal Devins and Louis Fisher, Judicial Exclusivity and Political
Instability, 84 Va. L. Rev. 83 (1998).
80. William H. Rehnquist, Constitutional Law and Public Opinion, 20 Suffolk U. L.
Rev. 751,768 (1986).
81. Id.
82. Id.; see also Max Lerner, Constitution and Court as Symbols, 46 Yale L.J. 1290,
1314 (1937) ("[J]udicial decisions are not babies brought by constitutional storks, but are
born out of the travail of economic circumstance.").
83. See Tom R. Tyler and Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and the Empowerment of
Discretionary Legal Authority: The United States Supreme Court and Abortion Rights, 43
Duke L.J. 703, 715 (1994) ("[P]ublic acceptance of the Court's role as interpreter of the
Constitution ... enhances public acceptance of controversial Court decisions.").
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of how public opinion affects Court decisionmaking is evident
when the Court reverses itself to conform its decisionmaking to
the social and political forces beating against it. In explaining
the collapse of the Lochner era, for example, Justice Owen Roberts recognized the extraordinary importance of public opinion:
"Looking back, it is difficult to see how the Court could have resisted the popular urge for uniform standards throu~hout the
country-for what in effect was a unified economy." 4 Social
and political forces also played a defining role in the Court's reconsideration of decisions on sterilization and the eugenics
movement, state-mandated flag salutes, the Roe v. Wade trimester standard, the death penalty, states' rights, and much more. 85
Absent popular support, these decisions proved ineffective. In
the end, as Justice Robert Jackson wrote, "[t]he practical play of
the forces of politics is such that judicial power has often delayed
but never permanently defeated the persistent will of a substantial majority. " 86
When taking social and political forces into account, moreover, the Court is apt to "exercise the rights of governance that
bring it prestige and to avoid exercising the rights of governance
that may bring it harm." 87 For example, when Congress signals
the Court that it has doubts about the constitutionality of its
handiwork, the Court does not risk much political capital by
striking down that law. 88

*****
Under contemporary conditions, courts have little incentive
to involve themselves in war powers disputes. Unlike Youngstown, unilateral executive war-making is now the norm. Not
only has Congress abandoned its traditional role, the public and
the media also see the president as the "sole organ" of modern
day war-making.

84. Owen J. Roberts, The Court and the Constitution 61 (Harvard U. Press, 1951).
85. For support of these claims, see sources cited in Devins and Fisher, 84 Va. L.
Rev. at 95 (cited in note 79) .
. 86. Robert H. Jackson, Maintaining Our Freedoms: The Role of the Judiciary, 19
V1tal Speeches of the Day, 759, 761 (1953).
87. McGinnis, 56 Law & Contemp. Probs. at 296 (cited in note 78).
88. For a general treatment of this subject, see Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 Studies in American Political
Development 35 (1993). See also Neal Devins, Congress as Culprit: How Lawmakers
Spurred on the Court's Anti-Congress Crusade, 51 Duke L.J. 435 (2001) (discussing ways
Ill which Congress is facilitating Rehnquist Court decisions invalidating federal statutes).
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Starting with Korea, presidents have bypassed Congress.
Rather than seek congressional authorization before initiating
military actions, presidents now see Congress as an after-the-fact
cheerleader. 89 Consider, for example, Congress's response to
President Clinton's decision to use military force in Bosnia. For
Senate majority leader Bob Dole: "[I]n my view the President
has the authority and the power under the Constitution to do
what he feels should be done regardless of what Congress
does." 90 Likewise, minority leader George Mitchell opposed legislation requiring the president to first seek congressional authorization for military action in Bosnia because such "prior restraints . . . plainly violate the Constitution. "91 By suggesting
that Congress has no role to play, lawmakers now seem more interested in protecting the executive branch than their own institution.
The constitutional position of Congress has deteriorated for
a number of reasons. One is the volunteer army. As Joseph
Califano has noted, an all-volunteer army "relieves affluent, vocal, voting Americans of the concern that their children will be at
risk of going into combat. "92 Likewise, deprived of a broadbased draft, university campuses are no longer centers of antiwar activity. Without such public pressure, lawmakers would
rather focus their efforts on constituent services and other matters helpful to their efforts to retain their seats. 93 Correspondingly, the growing cost of running for office means that legislators have less time to tend to their institutional and
constitutional duties.
Presidents, in contrast, often have strong incentives to
launch military initiatives. Presidents achieve status, fame if you
will, by leading the nation into battle. 94 For example, by launch89. For a detailing of Congress's ever-diminishing role, see Fisher, Abdication at 34114 (cited in note 4). See also Louis Fisher and Neal Devins, Political Dynamics of Constitutional Law 153-71 (West Group, 3d ed. 2001).
90. 141 Cong. Rec. S17,529 (daily ed. Nov. 27, 1995).
91. 139 Cong. Rec. 25,483 (1993). After Clinton deployed troops in 1995, the Senate defeated a "congressional authorization" bill by a vote of 77 to 22. 141 Cong. Rec.
S18,470 (daily ed. Dec. 13, 1995).
92. Joseph A. Califano, Jr., When There's No Draft, Wash. Post A23 (Apr. 6,
1999)).
93. See John A. Ferejohn, Pork Barrel Politics: Rivers and Harbors Legislation,
1947-1968 at 47-68 (Stanford U. Press, 1974); Terry M. Moe and William G. Howell, The
Presidential Power of Unilateral Action, 15 J. L. Econ. & Org. 132 (1999). It goes without
saying that opportunities to reward constituents this way have increased since World War
II and, as such, track Congress's diminishing interest in war powers.
94. For this very reason, the framers intended the Congress to play the dominant
role in initiating military actions. See William Michael Treanor, Fame, the Founding, and

2002]

STEEL SEIZURE CASE: ONE OF A KIND?

79

ing military strikes, a "rally around the president" phenomenon
guarantees a surge of 10 percentage points or more in the president's approval ratings. 9 And with military technology now
enabling presidents to wage war with few casualties, there are
strong incentives to launch such strikes. Also, with Congress
playing a diminishing role in war powers, expectations have developed about the president's constitutional powers and responsibilities. For example, when reporters claim that the president
does need the approval of Congress before launching military
strikes, they encourage the public to believe that the president
has the constitutional authority to initiate war. 96 Against this
backdrop, it is to be expected that the "president generally
places a very hi~h value on control of the rights of governance in
foreign affairs." 7 As these expectations of presidential dominance have become entrenched, lawmakers are even less likely
to risk the possible fallout (with their constituents) of opposing
military actions launched by the President.98
The judiciary, instead of questioning the president on national security matters and thereby protecting constitutional values, has largely stepped aside. Without the backing of Congress,
the courts have left presidential decision-making alonevalidating it outright or concluding that they lack the jurisdiction
to review it. In particular, starting with the war in Viet Nam,
courts have seen the momentous question of whether the president can commit the nation's blood to be outside its authority. 99
the Power to Declare War, 82 Cornell L. Rev. 695 (1997).
95. This phenomenon has been documented by the Gallup News Service. In the
wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks and the talk of military action in Afghanistan,
the news service posted a study on its website comparing President George W. Bush's
surge in approval ratings to the surges experienced by other Presidents in times of war.
See David W. Moore, Bush Job Approval Reflects "Rally" Effect: Close to Highest Approval Rating Ever Measured, Gallup News Service, (Sept. 18, 2001), available at
<http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/ pr010918.asp>.
96. For example, in several articles in 1995, a reporter for The New York Times
stated that President Clinton "does not need the approval of Congress to send troops to
the Balkans." Katharine Q. Seelye, Legislators Get Plea by Clinton on Bosnia Force,
N.Y. Times A1 (Nov. 29, 1995). For additional discussion, see Fisher, Abdication at 11214 (cited in note 4). For a recent counterexample, see David E. Sanger, There's a Small
Matter of Checks and Balances, N.Y. Times 4-1 (Jan. 27, 2002).
97. McGinnis, 56 Law & Contemp. Probs. at 306 (cited in note 78).
98. See Dante Fascell, War Powers and Congress, 50 U. Miami L. Rev. 121, 124
(1995). For a more detailed statement of how the individual interests of members of
Congress and the institutional interests of Congress diverge on war powers, see Neal
Devins, Abdication by Another Name: An Ode to Lou Fisher, 19 St. Louis U. Pub. L.
Rev. 65 (2000).
99. Law professors, many of whom opposed the war, were quick to condemn the
courts for abdicating their responsibilities. See Michael E. Tigar, Judicial Power, The
"Political Question Doctrine" and Foreign Relations, 17 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1135 (1970).
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During Viet Nam, judges dismissed-as "obviously a political
question" -some lawsuits challenging the president's authority
to wage war. 100 In other cases, plaintiffs were denied standing to
challenge the legality of the Viet N am war. 101 And in a lawsuit
filed by members of Congress, the court noted that it would not
decide war powers cases unless the President and Congress were
in "resolute conflict." 102 For its part, the U.S. Supreme Court
kept quiet by denying certiorari. 10
This pattern from the VietNam years has carried forward to
more recent decades. 104 The only noteworthy change is that
members of Congress have become the principal antagonists before the courts. During the 1980s and 1990s, members of Congress filed numerous lawsuits challenging the military initiatives
of Presidents Reagan, Bush, and Clinton. Typically, these members came as a small group unable to represent what Congress
intended as an institution. Also, they were often opposed by another group of legislators who defended the President. Standing
in the middle of this crossfire, federal judges essentially told the
legislators complaining of executive aggrandizement: "Don't
come in here and expect us to do your work for you."
Congress's failure to stake out an institutional position
prompted federal courts to toss out (on political question
grounds) lawmaker challen~es to Reagan-era military strikes in
Nicaragua and El Salvador. 05 Lawsuits challenging Reagan initiatives in Grenada and the Persian Gulf were, ultimately, dis-

100. Luftig v. McNamara, 252 F. Supp. 819, 819 (D.D.C. 1966), affd. 373 F.2d 664
(D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 945 (1967). See also DaCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d
1146, 1155 (2d Cir. 1973) (ruling that courts lack competence in military matters).
101. Campen v. Nixon, 56 F.R.D. 404 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
102. Drinan v. Nixon, 364 F. Supp. 854, 860 (D. Mass. 1973).
103. For a critique of this practice, see Louis Henkin, Viet-Nam in the Courts of the
Unired States: "Polirical Questions," 63 Am. J. Inti. Law 284 (1969). For a general defense
(not at all tied to war issues), see Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch:
The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics 126-33 (Hobbs-Merrill Co., 1962).
104. For some judges, however, "no one" can bring a case challenging the President's use of force because courts lack "judicially discoverable and manageable standards" for addressing and analyzing such claims. Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 24-25
(D.C. Cir. 2000) (Silberman, concurring). By making it impossible for courts ever to have
a say, this type of ruling is not simply a ducking of the issue (whereby the courts could
rule against the executive in some future case). Instead, it is effectively a substantive
declaration of executive supremacy on war making. See Koh, The National Security
Constitution at 216-24 (cited in note 3) (calling attention to how a political question ruling can operate like a substantive ruling on the merits).
105. Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893, 898-99 (D.D.C. 1982), affd, Crockett v.
Reagan, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 568 F. Supp. 596
(D.D.C. 1983), affd. 770 F.2d 202,204,210 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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missed on mootness grounds. 106 Ripeness was invoked to block
lawmakers challenging the constitutionality of President Bush's
ordering of offensive actions against Iraq in 1990. "[U]nless the
Congress as a whole, or by a majority, is heard from," wrote district court judge Harold Greene, "the controversy here cannot
be deemed ripe. " 107 And in explaining why members of Congress lacked standing to challenge President Clinton's launching
of air strikes in Yugoslavia, the court noted that Congress would
need to stake out an institutional position for there to be "an actual confrontation sufficient to confer standing. " 108
In concluding that there is no reason to protect a Congress
that is unwilling to defend itself, courts have largely abdicated
their role in military and national security matters. Unlike
Youngstown (where congressional silence did not deter judicial
action), today's courts seem oblivious to their constitutional duty
to analyze and interpret legal boundaries. Instead, they wait for
Congress to act. As then appellate judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg
put it: Congress "has formidable weapons at its disposal-the
power of the purse and investigative resources far beyond those
available in the Third Branch ... 'If the Congress chooses not to
confront the President, it is not our task to do so."d 09
The social and political forces that help explain Youngstown
are no longer at play today. Presidential war-making is now an
entrenched part of our cultural norms. Unless Congress wakes
up, courts seem unwilling to participate in this dramatic reshaping of our system of checks and balances. Lacking the powers of
purse and sword, courts are reluctant to contradict cultural
norms; instead, they look for ways to preserve their institutional
resources. Findings of no jurisdiction, certiorari denials, and the
like allow the courts to opt out of an issue until they have the
backing of Congress and/or the people.
Why this passivity by the courts on the crucial decision of
taking the country to war? The Court had no problem contradicting cultural norms during the Lochner era, and it certainly
pushed the envelope with Roe v. Wade. The contemporary Su106. Conyers v. Reagan, 765 F.2d 1124 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F.
Supp. 333 (D.D.C. 1987). For additional discussion, see Fisher, Abdication at 72-73 (cited
in note 4).
107. Del/urns v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141, 1151 (D.D.C. 1990).
108. Campbell v. Clinton, 52 F. Supp. 2d 34, 43 (D.D.C. 1999), affd. 203 F.3d 19
(D.C. Cir. 2000).
109. Sanchez-Espinoza, 770 F.2d at 211 (quoting Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996,
998 (Powell, J., concurring)).

82

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 19:63

preme Court, moreover, is not at all shy about countermanding
Congress for violating its enumerated powers on federalism and
other structural matters. 110 Against this backdrop, the Court's
acquiescence to cultural norms on war-making is disappointing.
The Justices should care about the structural protections of
separation of powers, and how that value is threatened by unilateral presidential wars.
Were lawmakers to defend their prerogatives, courts presumably would adjudicate these disputes and might well rule for
the Congress. Indeed, "[i]n two hundred years of dispute between the President and Congress over war and peace, commitment and neutrality, trade embargoes and arms sales," the Supreme Court has yet to invalidate a federal statute for impinging
on the president's foreign-affairs powers. 111 On this point, Viet
Nam era litigation is especially instructive. Before there was
popular opposition to the war, courts simply concluded that they
lacked jurisdiction to consider challenges to the constitutionality
of the war. In the final round of litigation, "when popular and
congressional opposition to the war was at its peak," 112 the
courts moderated their position. While affording the president
wide latitude to "wind down" the war, courts now argued that
the authorization issue was justiciable and that the Gulf of
Tonkin Resolution could not substitute for a congressional declaration of war. 113
Today, Youngstown seems curiously vibrant and anachronous. It remains vibrant because of its essential lesson: it appears
that contemporary courts will only check presidential war making when social and political forces support such a judicial role.
As a practical matter, this means that Congress cannot count on
the courts to protect its prerogatives. Concurring in Youngstown, Justice Jackson, in words that reflect the modern (not traditional) understanding of war powers, put it this way: '"The
tools belong to the man who can use them.' We may say that
110. It may be that Congress has encouraged this federalism revolution. See Neal
Devins, Congress as Culprit: How Lawmakers Spurred on the Court's Anti-Congress Crusade, 51 Duke L.J. 435 (2001).
111. Glennon, Constitutional Diplomacy at 13 (cited in note 69). Furthermore, only
one appellate court has invalidated an act of Congress on these grounds. See id. (referring to National Federation of Federal Employees v. United States, 695 F. Supp. 1196
(1988).
112. Cole, 99 Yale L.J. at 2083 (cited in note 3).
113. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 614-16 (D.C. Cir. 1973); HoltZTTUUI v.
Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307, 1311 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied 416 U.S. 936 (1974). For a
fuller treatment of this evolution, sec Ratner and Cole, 17 Loyola L.A. L. Rev. at 730-35
(cited in note 56).
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power to legislate for emergencies belongs in the hands of Congress, but only Con~ress itself can prevent power from slipping
through its fingers." 14 Essentially, Jackson was admitting that
the Court could not interpret the constitutional authority of the
President unless Congress asserted its role. That is a distinctly
modern notion. Courts in the past did not think that way.
It is for this very reason that Youngstown also seems a relic
of the past. Congress has let power slip from its fingers. More
striking, presidents now routinely claim the type of unlimited
power that was anathema to the courts at the time of Youngstown. Federal court filings, for example, now contend that "[t]he
Constitution commits to the executive branch the conduct of
American diplomatic and foreign affairs," and that whether hostilities exist or are imminent involves the President's responsibilities as 'Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy' ... and
as 'sole organ of the nation in its external relations.'" 115 And
while federal courts have not formally embraced these claims
(preferring, instead, to rule on jurisdictional grounds), the Supreme Court has adopted doctrinal formulas that put the onus
on Congress to speak against presidential initiatives (rather than
on the President to demonstrate that his conduct has been authorized by Congress or the Constitution). 116
III. CONCLUSION
The erosion of our system of checks and balances on war
powers issues, while understandable, is unfortunate. Complex
social policy issues, especially those that implicate constitutional
values, are best resolved through "the sweaty intimacy of creatures locked in combat." 117 More to the point, no branch of government should hold a monopoly on any of the Constitution's
key provisions; instead, "[s]ome arbiter is almost indispensable
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 654 (Jackson, J., concurring).
Glennon, Constitutional Diplomacy at 108 (cited in note 69) (quoting appellate
brief filed by the Justice Department in Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333 (D.D.C.
1987), a case involving President Reagan's deployment of troops to the Persian Gulf).
116. The most important of these cases is Dames and Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654
(1981). Here, the Court approved a Carter-era executive agreement securing the release
of American hostages. Because Congress did not formally approve of this arrangement,
the Court found "tacit" Congressional approval both by looking to other statutes and
Congress's silence in the face of the Carter initiative. In Youngstown, the Court specifically reJected a nearly identical Truman administration claim. See supra note 48. But in
Dames and Moore, the Court signaled that the burden of proof should be shifted away
from the president and to the Congress.
117. Bickel, Least Dangerous Branch at 261 (cited in note 103).
114.
115.
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when power is ... balanced between different branches." 118 On
war-making, the failure of Congress and the Court to check the
President has made the Constitution less vital, less durable. By
acting unilaterally, the president has effectively nullified the warmaking provisions of the Constitution. For these provisions to
have meaning, someone has to give them legal effect. A Congress that refuses to take a stand cannot accomplish this task.
Likewise, judicial invocations of various jurisdiction-limiting
doctrines eliminates the courts. 119
Unlike constitutional dialogues on some issues that are better left to the political branches, war powers is an issue where
judicial passivity contributes to a loss of legitimacy to constitutional government. 120 In particular, if it is the duty of courts to
safeguard the Constitution, how can judges conscientiously look
away while presidents usurp such a crucial power from the nation's representatives? Do we have a Constitution of limits, or is
it merely up for grabs? The Supreme Court reminds us that the
Constitution is one of enumerated powers. 121 Obviously, contemporary Justices do not believe that when it comes to the war
power. If that part of the Constitution can be regularly violated,
why not others? Gradually we lose respect for a written Constitution.
Beyond undermining the constitutional design, we cannot
expect foreign policy and national securit{; to be formulated well
in the hands of an unchecked executive. 1 2 Throughout our history, no branch has consistently demonstrated its wisdom on war
powers issues. Neither Congress nor the President (nor the
courts) can really assure the nation that it is truly wise on war
powers issues; "[t]he only assurance," as Alexander Bickel observed, "lies in process, in the duty to explain, justify and per118. Robert H. Jackson, The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy: A Study of a Crisis in
American Power Politics 9 (Knopf, 1941).
119. Without meaningful judicial review, there is reason to doubt the very legitimacy
of presidential initiatives. "What a government of limited powers needs," as Charles
Black explained, "is some means of satisfying the people that it has taken all steps humanly possible to stay within its powers ... [T)he Court, through its history, has acted as
the legitimator of the government." Charles L. Black, Jr., The People and the Court: Judicial Review in a Democracy 52 (Macmillan Co., 1960). Judicial review is also critical to
the rule of law. See Philip B. Kurland, The Rise and Fall of the "Doctrine" of Separation
of Powers, 85 Mich. L. Rev. 592, 612 (1986) (noting that the rule of law "requires that
government not act except according to preestablished rule").
120. See Devins and Fisher, 84 Va. L. Rev. at 98-106 (cited in note 79) (arguing that
interbranch conflict encourages the constructive evolution of constitutional norms).
121. "Under our Constitution, the Federal Government is one of enumerated powers." Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 516 (1997).
122. See Louis Fisher, Unchecked Presidential Wars, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1637 (2000).
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suade, to define the national interest by evoking it, and thus to
act by consent." 123 For example, even if one were to argue that
presidents have institutional advantages over Congress in national security affairs, 124 presidents may launch military initiatives to deflect attention from a policy crisis at home and for
other reasons having little to do with the national interest.
For reasons we have detailed, there is little reason to think
that future presidents, Congresses, and Supreme Courts will reinvigorate the system of checks and balances. Indeed, with no
meaningful congressional resistance, President George W. Bush
has invoked the ongoing "War on Terrorism" as justification for
assertin~ "far greater powers for the executive branch at
home." 1 5 Although Bush sought congressional authorization
both for the use of force against the terrorists and to launch an
attack against Iraq, his administration almost always acts unilaterally without either consulting Congress or seeking statutory
authority. 126 And while the public may ultimately disapprove of
these initiatives, 127 this after-the-fact check still leaves it to the

123. Alexander M. Bickel, The Need for a War-Powers Bill, The New Republic 17,
18 (Jan. 22, 1972). See also John Hart Ely, Suppose Congress Wanted a War Powers Act
That Worked, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1379, 1421 (1988) (favorably citing Bickel); Lee H.
Hamilton, The Role of Congress in U.S. Foreign Policy, speech delivered to the Center
for Strategic and International Studies, at 1 (Nov. 19, 1998) (arguing that a better foreign
policy is produced by a "creative tension between the President and the Congress").
124. In making this assumption, we do not mean to express an opinion on whether
this view is correct. Arguments on this issue can be found in McGinnis, 56 Law & Contemp. Probs. at 305-08 (cited in note 78) (in support); Glennon, Constitutional Diplomacy
at 314-15 (cited in note 69) (detailing but, ultimately, rejecting these arguments); Fisher,
Abdication at 166-70 (cited in note 4) (also rejecting).
125. Sanger, There's a Small Matter of Checks and Balances (cited in note 96). See
also David E. Sanger, Bush, Focusing on Terrorism, Says Secure U.S. is Top Priority,
N.Y. Times A1 (Jan. 30, 2002) (noting President Bush's apparent willingness to launch
military strikes against nations that are developing weapons that could be used against
the United States)
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president to set the terms and conditions governing the use of
force.
All of this brings us back to Youngstown. The speed in
which the Court acted and the firmness of its decision is a testament to how social and political forces shape judicial decisionmaking. And while the very forces that enabled the Court to
check Truman now speak to the Court's refusal to resolve war
powers disputes, the fact remains that today's Court has yet to
embrace the President's claim of exclusive war-making power.
Were the public (or Congress) willing to stand up to presidential
unilateralism, the Court would likely restore its role in our system of checks and balances.
"The consequence of the limitations under which the Court
must sometimes operate in this area," as Earl Warren put it, is
that "[the people] must remain vigilant to preserve the principles
of our [Constitution]." 128 In Youngstown, with public opinion
against the president, the war in Korea, and the steel seizure itself, courts were willing to repudiate the Truman administration's sweeping assertions of unlimited presidential powers. The
lesson here is simple: For our system of checks and balances to
work, all parts of government and the public must participate.
Concentrating the whole of the war power in a single branch is
repugnant to our constitutional system.
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Warren, 37 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 192,203 (cited in note 67).

